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II n t roduct i on
The nat ure of the em pl oym ent  cont r act has l ong at t r acted the at t enti on of econom i sts. 
Par t i cular em phasi s has recentl y focused on t he i mp l i cati ons of di f f erent t ypes of
em ploym ent  cont r act such as fi xed w ages,  self -em ploym ent  and perf orma n c e  r elated 
pay.
1 Mo s t  of t he research in t hi s area has expl ored such imp l i cati ons fr om  t he
perspecti ve of  t he i ndi vi dual .   On e   t hem e t hat   has dom i nat ed r esearch i nt o em ploym ent  
cont r acts focuses on w hat  t ype of i ndi vi dual  i s li kel y t o ent er a part i cular t ype of
em ploym ent   cont r act.   R ecent  r esearch has,   f or  exam ple,  f ocused on t he att r i but es of  t he 
self -em ployed concent r ati ng on characteri sti cs such as gender,  ethni cit y and father’ s 
occupat i on -  see Le  ( 1999)  f or  a com prehensive  survey  of  t hi s area.
H ence, fam il y background and i ndi vi dual   characteri sti cs appear  t o be i m port ant 
det ermi nant s of  an i ndi vi dual ’ s observed  em ploym ent   status.   On e   mi ght   also predict  t hat  
i nt r a-househol d i nfl uences such as the em pl oym ent  status of one’s spouse m ay al so 
aff ect an indi vi dual ’ s observed em pl oym ent  status.  Indi vi dual  characteri sti cs such as 
ma r i t al  status,   f or  exam ple,  have been i ncorporated i nt o som e em pir i cal  studi es of  self -
em ploym ent .   Bl anchfl ow er  and Os wa l d ( 1990)  and Be r nhardt   ( 1994),   f or  i nst ance,  f i nd 
t hat   havi ng  a wor ki ng  spouse  enhances  t he  probabi l i t y  of  self -em ploym ent .
I n a si mi l ar vei n,  recent li t erature has focused on t he si mi l ari t y of em ploym ent  
status w i t hi n coupl es [see, for exam ple, Br adburye t  al  (1986) a n d  Da wk i ns et  al
( 2001)] .   These studi es suggest   t hat   t he  phenom enon  of  ‘ assort ati ve  ma t i ng’  ma y   off er  an 
expl anati on.  The assort ati ve m at i ng t heory st ates that  indi vi dual s are m ore li kel y t o 
ma t ch w it h i ndi vi dual s w it h si mi l ar characteri sti cs to t hem sel ves such as age and
1  The  eff i ciency wa g e   hypot hesi s,  f or  exam ple,  has  exam ined  t he  not i on  t hat   t he  f i r m’ s product i on  costs 
mi ght  be i nversely related to fi xed w ages and,  in so doi ng,  provi des an expl anati on for equi l i bri um  
unem pl oym ent   [ Shapi r o  and  St i gl i t z ( 1984)] .   The  analysi s of  self - em ploym ent   has  f ocused  on  i t s pot enti al 
as a m eans of  all eviati ng  unem pl oym ent   [ Tayl or  ( 1996)] .   Per haps  mo s t   cont r oversial  of  all   has  been t he 
academ ic  i nt erest  i n  PRP  wh e r e  att enti on  has  f ocused  on  i t s mi croeconom i c  benefi t s [ Bl i nder  ( 1990)] .3
educati on l evels and t hi s expl ains why t hey have simi l ar  l abour  ma r ket   experi ences.
2  I n 
general,   t hi s l i t erature has  concentr ated on  expl ori ng  t he  grow i ng  phenom enon  of  j obl ess 
househol ds.
We  a i m t o ext end t hi s concept furt her by expl ori ng cont r act t ype m at ching 
wi t hi n duel   earner  coupl es as we l l   as across t he extended househol d by f ocusi ng on all  
wo r ki n g  me mb e r s of the househol d.
3 We  a i m,  therefore, to ascert ain w het her int r a-
coupl e and i nt r a-househol d em ploym ent   cont r act  t ype ma t ching i s prevalent  or  wh e t her 
hol di ngs of  di versif i ed port f ol i os of  em ploym ent   cont r acts wi t hi n coupl es/househol ds -
t hereby  i mp l yi ng  i nforma l   i nsurance arr angem ent s –  are mo r e com m on.  
I n cont r ast  t o t he l i mi t ed am ount   of  existi ng r esearch i n t hi s area wh i ch f ocuses 
on sel f -em ploym ent ,  we  s e t  our analysi s w it hi n a wi der fr am ew ork by focusi ng on a 
r ange of em ploym ent  cont r act types (such as self -em ploym ent ,  cont r acts characteri sed 
by bonus schem es and fi xed w age cont r acts) wh e r eby t hese em pl oym ent  cont r acts are 
expl ored coll ecti vel y  r ather  t han  i n  i solati on.
4  Cont r acts characteri sed by  bonus  schem es 
are r egarded here as a hybri d of  self -em ploym ent   and f i xed wa g e   em ploym ent   such t hat  
t here i s a f i xed  and  a vari able com ponent   t o  r em unerati on.   Ou r   dat a wh i ch i s draw n f r om  
t he  Br i t i sh F am il y Expendi t ure Surveys 1996 t o 2000 i s part i cularl y appropri ate f or  our 
purpose si nce it  harbours the key facets requi r ed for our analysi s, cont aini ng det ail ed 
i nforma t i on on em pl oym ent  cont r acts as w ell  as indi vi dual  and househol d
characteri sti cs.
Ou r  m odel l i ng st r ategy i s to present t hree dif f erent stati sti cal f r am ew orks;
mu l t i nom i al logi t  analysi s, ordered probi t  analysi s and random  eff ects ordered probi t  
analysi s.  For   t he  l att er  t wo   m odel s,  we   order  em ploym ent   cont r act  t ypes  accordi ng  t o t he
2I ndeed,  i t   ma y   be  t he  case  t hat   such peopl e  are  l i kel y  to m eet  t hei r   part ners i n  t he  wo r kpl ace. 
3  We   use  t he  t erm  coupl es  t o  r efer  t o  i ndi vi dual s w ho  are  eit her  ma r r i ed  or  cohabi t i ng.
4 The bonus schem es i ncl ude Chri stm as bonuses, product i vi t y bonuses,  profi t  related bonuses,  loyal t y 
bonuses,   di vi dends,   i ncenti ve  schem es and  perf orm ance/sales  bonuses.4
i mp l i ed degree of ‘i ncom e ri sk’ associated w i t h each contr act.  W e assum e that  fi xed 
w age em pl oym ent  i s characteri sed by t he l east i ncom e ri sk and self -em ploym ent
characteri sed by t he m ost  i ncom e ri sk w it h bonus em pl oym ent  l yi ng som ew here
bet w een t hese  extr em es.  Gi ven  t he  general  consensus t hat   self -em ploym ent   i s i nherentl y 
mo r e ri sky t han fi xed w age em pl oym ent ,  our ranki ng i n t erms  o f  incom e ri sk seem s 
appropri ate.
Ou r  em pir i cal evidence l ends support  f or t he phenom enon of em ploym ent
cont r act t ype m at ching w i t hi n coupl es and househol ds.  It  m ay be t he case that  the 
benefi t s of  ma t ching  wi t h  ‘ l i ke-m i nded’  peopl e ( t hose  wi t h  simi l ar  t astes,  preferences or 
degrees of ri sk aversion) ma y  s i mp l y out we i gh t he benefi t s of incom e ri sk pool i ng.  
Al t ernat i vel y,  t r ansfers of speciali sed hum an capi t al wi t hi n dual  earner coupl es and 
wi t hi n househol ds m ay i ncrease the associated benefi t s of hol di ng m at ched contr act 
t ypes.  Mo r eover,  t r ansfers of hum an capit al wi t hi n coupl es and w it hi n househol ds 
enhance earni ngs pot enti al vi a enhanced product i vi t y.  Thus,  i t  i s apparent t hat
em ploym ent  cont r act t ype m at ching m ay have si gni f i cant i mp l i cati ons for t he
product i vi t y  of  ma t ched i ndi vi dual s and,   hence,   f or  t he  econom y  as a w hol e.
The paper proceeds as fol l ow s:  Secti on II  presents the background t o our
analysi s w hil st Secti on II I  descri bes t he dat a and Secti on IV p r esents a detail ed
di scussion of  our  stati sti cal  f r am ew ork.   Secti on V  presents our  f i ndi ngs and Secti on VI  
concl udes  our  analysi s.
II Background
The  i dea t hat   econom i c ma n   i s f ar  f r om  t he m yopi c i ndi vi dual i st  so com m onl y assum ed 
i n cont em porary analysi s is not  new .  In hi s Theory of Mo r a l  Sent i me n t s ,  the foundi ng 
f ather  of  econom i c science observed:5
Ho w  self i sh,  soever,   ma n   ma y   be  supposed,   t here are evident l y  som e pri nci pl es i n  nat ure, 
wh i ch int erest hi m i n t he fort une of  ot hers, and render thei r  happi ness necessary t o hi m,  
t hough he deri ves not hi ng f r om  i t   except  t he pl easure of  seeing i t .   …  .   Ever y ma n   f eels hi s 
ow n  pl easures and  hi s ow n  pai ns  mo r e sensibl y  t han  t hose  of  ot her  peopl e.  The  f orme r   are 
t he ori gi nal  sensati ons;   t he l att er  t he r efl ected or  sym pathet i c i ma g e s   of  t hese sensati ons.  
Af t er hi ms e l f ,  th e  me mb e r s of hi s ow n fam il y,  those w ho usual l y l i ve i n t he sam e house 
wi t h hi m,  hi s parents, hi s brot hers and sisters are naturall y t he obj ects of hi s w arme s t  
aff ecti ons  …  hi s sym pathy  wi t h  t hem   i s mo r e precise and  det ermi nat e,  t han  i t   can be  wi t h 
t he  greater  part   of  ot her  peopl e.  I t   approaches,  nearer,   i n  short ,   t o  wh a t   he  f eels f or  hi ms e l f .  
[ Sm i t h  1759)] .
Si mi l ar  senti me n t s we r e echoed by anot her  great  mi nd i n hi s classic study of  consum er 
preferences som e t wo   centuri es l ater:
W ho aft er  all   i s t he consum er  i n t he t heory of  consum er’ s ( not   consum ers’)   behavi our? I s 
he  a bachelor? A  spinst er? Or   i s he  a ‘ spendi ng  uni t ’   as defi ned  by  stati sti cal  pol l sters and 
r ecorders of   budget ary  spendi ng.   [ Sam uel son  ( 1956)] .
I ndeed,  i t   shoul d not   be surpri sing t hat   i ndi vi dual s,  w ho generall y l i ve i n som e f orm  of 
social uni t ,  take int o account  the preferences and uti l i t i es of ot her me mb e r s of thei r  
f am il y.  Per haps l ess obvi ous i s the i dea that  indi vi dual s m ight  take int o account  the 
nat ure of the em pl oym ent  cont r act of ot her fam il y  me mb e r s. For  exam ple, indi vi dual s 
on ‘hi gh ri sk’ em ploym ent  cont r acts m ight  be at t r acted to i ndi vi dual s on ‘l ow  ri sk’ 
cont r acts. Al t ernat i vel y,  indi vi dual s w it hi n fam il y uni t s m ight  be i ncl i ned t o search for 
com plem entary  em ploym ent s –  one  part ner  mi ght   pursue sati sfyi ng,   but   r elati vel y  r i sky,  
self -em ploym ent   bol stered i n t he com fort i ng securi t y of  t he ot her  part ner’ s w eekly pay 
cheque.
Ou r  f ocus i n t hi s paper i s the possi bi l i t y t hat  i nt r a-coupl e and / or i nt r a-
househol d i nfl uences exist over indi vi dual s’ opt i ma l  choi ce of em ploym ent  cont r act.  
I ndi vi dual s ma y   pool   i ncom e r i sk wi t h t hei r   part ner  - a self -em ployed  person  all eviati ng 
t he i nt r i nsi c ri sks associated w it h sel f -em ploym ent  by m arr yi ng a fi xed w age part ner.  6
On  t he ot her hand,  it  m ay be t he case that  cont r act ma t ching exi sts w it h i ndi vi dual s 
wi t hi n  a f am il y  uni t   bei ng  em ployed  under  simi l ar  cont r acts.
These possibi l i t i es w ere all uded t o by Becker (1974) i n hi s tr eati se on t he 
econom i cs of ma r r i age. B ecker suggest ed that  hi gh earni ng m al es m ight  opt i ma l l y 
ma t ch w it h fem ales speciali sing i n hom e product i on,  a phenom enon he referr ed to as 
‘ negat i ve assort ati ve ma t i ng on t he basi s of  earni ngs’.   Mo r e r ecent  r esearch on  spousal  
selecti on and m ari t al sort i ng has proff ered support  f or posi t i ve earni ngs m at ching.
N akost een and Zimme r  (2001),  for exam ple, fi nd t hat  indi vi dual s w hose earni ngs are 
above  average t end  t o  ma r r y  i ndi vi dual s wi t h  simi l ar  earni ngs  t r ait s.
Ther e is som e evidence t hat  self -em ploym ent  propensi t y acts as a sort i ng
m echanism ,  wi t h  i ndi vi dual s simi l arl y  i ncl i ned  t o  self -em ploym ent   mo r e l i kel y  t o  ma r r y 
ceteris pari bus  [ Br uce ( 1999)] .   Br uce f i nds  evidence  t hat   a husband’s experi ence of  self -
em ploym ent  i ncreases the probabi l i t y t hat  hi s w if e w il l  becom e self -em ployed.
Mo r eover,   t he eff ect  of  a husband’s self -em ploym ent  is found t o be l argest  if  he i s self -
em ployed wh e n   t he wi f e i s consi deri ng t he t r ansit i on t o self -em ploym ent .   Thi s coul d be 
i ndi cati veof  t he  i m port ance of  i nt r a-househol d  t r ansfers of  hum an  capit al,   such t r ansfers 
r aising  t he  product i vi t y  and,   t hereby,   t he  earni ng  capacit y  of  self -em ploym ent .
Si mi l ar evidence hi ghl i ght i ng t he i m port ance of int er-generati onal  tr ansfers of 
hum an capit al  i s provi ded by D unn and Ho l t z -E akin ( 2000)  w ho f i nd evidence of  i nt er-
generati onal   t r ansfers of  hum an  capit al,   t he  existence of  a self -em ployed  parent  havi ng  a 
l arger  eff ect  on  a chil d’s self -em ploym ent   t r ansit i on  probabi l i t y  t han  t he  f i nanci al  w ealt h 
of  t he parent.
5  I n  a simi l ar  vei n,   De   Wi t   and  van  Wi nden  ( 1989)  f i nd  t hat   an i ndi vi dual ’ s 
propensi t y t o becom e sel f -em ployed i s enhanced i f  hi s father w as self -em ployed or 
com m enced self -em ploym ent   at  a l ater  stage wh i l st  Li ndh and Oh l sson ( 1996)  f i nd t hat  
5  See  Bl anchfl ow er  and  Os wa l d  ( 1998)  f or  a  det ail ed  di scussion  of  t he  l i nk  bet w een  f am il y  assets and  self -
em ploym ent .7
havi ng a sel f -em ployed father ( mo t her)  i m pacts posi t i vel y (i nsi gni f i cantl y) on t he
probabi l i t y of self -em ploym ent .  Indeed, t he l att er result s suggest  t hat  t he l arger t he 
busi ness ow ned by t he father,  the m ore li kel y i s self -em ploym ent .  Thus,  it  m ay be t he 
case that  t he chi l dren of self -em ployed parents have t he opport uni t y t o acqui r e the 
necessary hum an capi t al fr om  a relati vel y young age result i ng i n t hem  set t i ng up t hei r  
ow n  busi nesses or  becom ing  i nvol ved  i n  t he  f am il y  busi ness.
Si mi l ar argum ent s for the t r ansm i ssion of val uabl e w ork experi ence, reput ati on 
or  m anageri al  hum an capit al  f r om  parent  t o off spri ng can be ma d e   across part ners and,  
i n addi t i on,  across househol d  me mb e r s in general.  Lombar d (2001) analyses w age 
r esidual s as m easures of  observed characteri sti cs of  spouses before and aft er  ma r r i age; 
t he  assum pti on  bei ng  t hat   i ndi vi dual s harbour  characteri sti cs not   captured i n  t he  dat a but  
are observed by peers pri or to m arr i age.
6 The r esult s suggest  that  the probabi l i t y of 
bei ng sel f -em ployed i s higher wi t h a sel f -em ployed husband and l ow er if  ma r r i ed to a 
wa g e / salary w orker.  Mo r eover,  the result s also indi cate that  havi ng a sel f -em ployed
husband exert s a l arge and posi t i ve i nfl uence on t he earni ngs of  self -em ployed f em ales 
hi ghl i ght i ng t he i m port ance of  i nt ra-coupl e t r ansfers of  hum an  capit al.
The evidence sum m ari sed above al l udes t o a m at ching of em ploym ent
cont r acts,  especiall y f or  t he case of  self -em ploym ent .   Schi l l er  and  Cr ew son  ( 1997),   on 
t he ot her hand,  fi nd evi dence of int r a-coupl e ri sk pool i ng w i t h a husband’s pri ma r y 
em ploym ent   i ncreasing t he probabi l i t y t hat   a wi f e wi l l   be observed i n self   em ploym ent .  
As  a r gued by Le (1999),  ma r r i age is assum ed in t he econom i cs li t erature to represent 
6 Such f i ndi ngs i nt r oduce an addit i onal  di me n s i on t o t he debat e over wh e t her ma r r i age is product i vi t y
enhanci ng  wh i ch  centr es  around  t he  evidence  suggest i ng  t hat   ma r r i ed  me n   earn  mo r e  t han  unm arr i ed  me n .  
Ko r enm an and N eum ark (1991) present evidence suggest i ng t hat  ma r r i age is product i vi t y enhanci ng 
wh i l st Cor nw el l  and Rupert  (1997) present evidence t o t he cont r ary.  It  m ay be t he case that  any 
product i vi t y  eff ects ma y   be  enhanced  i f   part ners ma t ch  on  em ploym ent   cont r act  t ype.8
stabil i t y and,  as such, m ay provi de a sui t able background for ri sky self -em ploym ent .
7
Gi ven t hat  Bl anchfl ow er a n d  Os wa l d (1990) and Bernhardt  (1994) fi nd t hat  havi ng a 
wo r ki ng spouse enhances t he probabi l i t y of  self -em ploym ent ,   t hi s ma y   i ncl ude f i nanci al 
stabil i t y.
To  s u mma r i se,  i t   appears t o be t he case t hat   t he i nci dence of  self -em ploym ent
wi t hi n a coupl e has signi f i cant  i mp l i cati ons f or  t he observed em ploym ent   status of  t he 
ot her part y.  The existi ng l i t erature has focused al mo s t  exclusi vel y on t he case of self -
em ploym ent  vi s a vis fi xed w age em pl oym ent .  We  s e t  our anal ysi s w it hi n a m ore 
general fr am ew ork by focusi ng on a range of em ploym ent  cont r act types nam el y sel f -
em ploym ent ,  cont r acts characteri sed by bonus schem es and fi xed w age cont r acts
wh e r eby  t hese  em ploym ent   cont r acts are expl ored coll ecti vel y.
III D ata
Ou r   dat a i s draw n f r om   t he  Fami l y Expendi t ure  Survey ( FES)   f or  Gr eat  Br i t ain,   wh i ch i s 
a nati onal l y representati ve survey t hat  has been conduct ed on an annual  basi s since 
1957.  Som e 10, 000 househol ds are selected each year to t ake part  in t he FES,  and t he 
average r esponse  r ate i s around  70% .   The  ma i n  aim  of  t he  survey  i s t o  provi de  a r eli able 
source of  i nforma t i on  on  househol d  expendi t ure,  i ncom e  and  ot her  aspects of  househol d 
f i nances.   To  account   f or  seasonal  di f f erences i n expendi t ure,  f ace-to-face int ervi ew s are 
spread evenly  over  t he  year.   Each i ndi vi dual   aged 16  or  over  i n  t he  househol ds  vi sit ed i s 
asked t o keep di ary records of dai l y expendi t ure for two  we e k s .  Respondent s are also 
asked t o com pl ete an incom e quest i onnai r e. The FES i s especiall y appropri ate for our 
7  If t hi s i s t rue,  t he  risk preferences of  coupl es ma y   be  di fferent  from  t hose  of  t he  rest  of  t he  popul ati on 
and t hi s raises concerns about  pot enti al selecti on bi as w hen w e look at  our sam ple of duel  earners. 
Ho we v e r   our  dat a set  i s not   r i ch enough t o all ow  us t o m odel   t he selecti on i nt o ma r r i age.  I f   ma r r i age i s 
seen as r i sk pool i ng  behavi our  t hen  our  sam ple of  duel   earners are l i kel y  t o  be  mo r e r i sk averse t han  t he 
general  popul ati on  and  t hus  our  r esult s wi l l   underesti ma t e t he  desi r e t o  ma t ch em ploym ent   cont r act  t ypes 
wi t hi n  t he  wi der  popul ati on.  9
purposes si nce it  harbours the key facets requi r ed for our analysi s. It  cont ains det ail ed 
i nforma t i on on em ploym ent   cont r acts,  i ndi vi dual   specif i c characteri sti cs and househol d 
specif i c characteri sti cs. W e use dat a fr om  1996 t o 2000
8 and i ncl ude w orki ng adul t s 
aged bet w een 16  and  65  w ho  are em ployed  under  eit her  a f i xed  wa g e   cont r act,   a cont r act 
characteri sed by  a bonus  schem e or  are self -em ployed.
9    Fr om   t hi s dat a we   generate t wo  
sam ples,  i ni t i all y  we   concentr ate on  ma t ched wo r ki ng  coupl es ( i . e.  we   have  observat i ons 
on bot h part ners).  Thi s gives us a sam pl e of 9276 w orki ng coupl es yieldi ng a t ot al of 
18552 observat i ons.   Secondl y,   we   extend our  analysi s by expl ori ng corr elati ons across 
wo r ki n g  me mb e r s of househol ds – t hi s gives us a sam pl e of 31862 w orkers li vi ng i n 
19604  househol ds.
Tabl e O ne in t he A ppendi x presents the di str i but i on of em ploym ent  cont r acts 
across t he sam ple by vari ous i ndi vi dual   and househol d characteri sti cs f or  t he sam ple of 
dual  earner coupl es. Tabl e Three in t he A ppendi x presents the sam e i nforma t i on as 
Tabl e O ne for the sam pl e of wo r ki ng househol d  me mb e r s w hil st Tabl e Tw o in t he 
A ppendi x  presents i nforma t i on  pert aini ng  t o  t he  di str i but i on  of  cont r act  t ype  wi t hi n  dual  
earner  coupl es.
III.ID u e l   E arner Coupl es
W e can see fr om  Tabl e O ne that  me n  a r e m ore li kel y t o hol d em pl oym ent  cont r acts 
associated wi t h i ncom e r i sk,  but   t he ma j ori t y of  em ployed me n   ( and wo me n )   hol d f i xed 
w age cont r acts.  H ence, fi xed w age cont r acts are the dom i nant  form o f  em ploym ent  
cont r act across the i ndi vi dual  and househol d specif i c characteri sti cs but  t here are
i nt eresti ng di f f erences in t he relati ve i nci dence of em ploym ent  cont r act t ypes gi ven
t hese  characteri sti cs.
8  Pr i or  t o  t hi s peri od  t he  dat aset  had  a  sli ght l y  di f f erent  str uct ure  and  som e of  t he  vari ables  r equi r ed  f or  our 
analysi s are  not   avail able.
9  A  sm all   num ber  of  i ndi vi dual s wi t h mo r e t han one j ob,   i ndi vi dual s em ployed by t he arme d   f orces and 
agri cult ural  wo r kers we r e  excluded  f r om   t he  analysi s.10
The pr oport i on of i ndi vi dual s in sel f -em ploym ent  i ncreases across the age 
groups,  wh i ch is consi stent wi t h t he hypot hesi s that  ol der peopl e w ho fi nd t hem sel ves 
out  of em ploym ent  oft en turn t o sel f -em ploym ent  gi ven t hat  t hei r  chance of r e-
em ploym ent   i s l ow .   Al t ernat i vel y,   t hi s i s also consi stent  wi t h t he hypot hesi s t hat   ol der 
peopl e face less li qui di t y const r aint s perhaps due t o t he accum ulati on of  w ealt h/ savings 
and are therefore bett er able to absorb t he i ncom e uncert aint y associated w it h sel f -
em ploym ent .
10  Mo r eover,   t hey  ma y   also have  t he  capit al  necessary  t o  start   a busi ness.
  The  age profi l e of  peopl e em ployed on bonus pay cont r acts i s n-shaped - t hi s 
ma y   be due t o t hat   f act  t hat   such cont r acts have been mo r e wi del y i nt r oduced over  t he 
l ast decade. Thus,  w e m ay be observi ng a cohort  eff ect rather than a t r ue age profi l e.
The  age profi l e of  peopl e on  f i xed  wa g e   cont r acts,  on  t he  ot her  hand,   i s skew ed t ow ards 
t he youngest  age group (i . e. t hose l ess than t we n t y),  suggest i ng t hat  t he i ncom e
uncert aint y associated w it h bonus pay cont r acts and self -em ploym ent  m ay be
prohi bi t i vel y hi gh for indi vi dual s wi t h l i t t l e l abour  ma r ket   experi ence.  I n addi t i on,   t hey 
are l ess l i kel y  t o  have  acqui r ed t he  necessary  capit al  t o  becom e self -em ployed.
I ndi vi dual s in sel f -em ploym ent  have a hi gh probabi l i t y of havi ng no forma l  
qual i f i cati ons.  Bonus em pl oym ent  cont r acts, on t he ot her hand,  are concentr ated
am ongst   peopl e wi t h f orma l   school   qual i f i cati ons and above,   wh i l st  i ndi vi dual s hol di ng 
f i xed wa g e   cont r acts are evenly spread across all   l evels of  school i ng.   H ence educati on 
appears t o be an i m port ant  f actor  i n expl aini ng  t he  probabi l i t y  of  hol di ng  bonus  cont acts 
or  bei ng  self -em ployed  but   ma y   not   be  an i m port ant  f actor  i n  expl aini ng  w hy  i ndi vi dual s 
hol d  f i xed  wa g e   cont r acts. 
Wi t h respect to t he occupat i onal  class vari ables, we  f i nd t hat  the i nci dence of 
f i xed  wa g e   em ployment   i ncreases as t he  l evel  of  skil l   associated wi t h  t he  j ob  f all s,  bei ng 
10  See Bl anchfl ow er  and Os wa l d ( 1998)  f or  a det ail ed analysi s of  t he  i m port ance of  capit al  const r aint s f or 
t he  probabi l i t y  of  becom ing  self-em ployed.11
concentr ated in t he part l y ski l l ed and unski l l ed categori es. Bonus cont r acts are m ost 
com m on am ong professional s,  m anagers and skil l ed wo r kers and t he i nci dence of  self -
em ploym ent   i s hi gh  f or  professional   and  unski l l ed wo r kers. 
I n relati on t o househol d characteri sti cs, we  f i nd t hat  t he corr elati on w i t h
househol d i ncom e suggest s t hat   bonus cont r act  em ployees l i ve i n t he r i chest  househol ds 
and f i xed wa g e   em ployees l i ve i n t he poorest househol ds.   I t   shoul d,   how ever,   be not ed 
t hat   di f f erent  cont r act  t ypes ma y   be characteri sed by di f f erent  l evels of  average i ncom e.  
Thi s i ssue wi l l   be  di scussed f urt her  i n  Secti on  I V.
On e   mi ght   also hypot hesi se t hat   t he num ber  of  chil dren and t he age of  chil dren
coul d aff ect thei r  parent’ s w il l i ngness t o t ake on incom e ri sk, we  t herefore look at  the 
num ber  of  pre-school   and school   age chil dren i n t he househol d.   Pr e-school   chil dren are 
di str i but ed evenly across em ploym ent  cont r acts, but  the average num ber of school   age 
chil dren i s hi gher  f or  self -em ployed  wo r kers,  t hi s i s probabl y  due  t o  t he  f act  ( hi ghl i ght ed 
earl i er)   t hat   self -em ployed wo r kers are on average ol der  t han wo r kers on bonus or  f i xed 
wa g e   em ploym ent   cont r acts.
  I n r elati on t o housi ng t enure,  f i xed w age em ployees are mo s t   l i kel y t o be f ound 
l i vi ng i n rented accom m odati on (l ocal authori t y and pri vat e rented).  The i nci dence of 
self -em ploym ent   i s l ow est   f or  i ndi vi dual s l i vi ng  i n  l ocal  authori t y  r ented propert i es.  Thi s 
ma y   be associated wi t h a l ack of  coll ateral  wi t h wh i ch t o secure l oans necessary t o start  
up a sm all   busi ness gi ven t hat   housi ng equi t y i s oft en used as coll ateral.   The  i nci dence 
of  bonus  pay  cont r acts,  on  t he  ot her  hand,   i s hi ghest   am ongst   ow ner-occupiers.
Fi nal l y w e expl ore the em pl oym ent  status of ot her me mb e r s of the househol d.  
We  f i nd t hat  t he presence of an unem pl oyed,  sick or a fi xed w age person i n t he 
househol d i s hi gher  f or  peopl e hol di ng f i xed wa g e   cont r acts.  Ha v i ng a r eti r ed person i n 
t he househol d i s mo r e l i kel y f or  self -em ployed  wo r kers - t hi s mi ght   be  r elated t o  t he  f act 12
t hat   self -em ployed peopl e are on average t hem sel ves ol der.   U noccupi ed peopl e are l ess 
com m on i n t he househol ds of bonus cont r act em ployees w ho are m ost li kel y t o reside 
wi t h anot her bonus cont r act em ployee. Be i ng sel f -em ployed i s m ore highl y corr elated 
wi t h havi ng a person i n t he househol d w ho i s in ful l -ti me   educati on,   but   t hi s mi ght   be 
expl ained by t he fact that  the sel f -em ployed t end t o be ol der and t herefore are m ore 
l i kel y t o have chi l dren in furt her educati on.  The pr esence of anot her self -em ployed
person i n t he househol d i s hi gher  f or  t he self -em ployed  peopl e i n  our  sam ple.  Thi s mi ght  
be due t o t he fact t hat  househol d  me mb e r s m ay becom e absorbed i nt o t he fam il y 
busi ness.
Tabl e Tw o presents the di str i but i on of em ploym ent  cont r act type w i t hi n dual  
earner  coupl es wh e r e bot h part ners are wo r ki ng.   I t   i s apparent  t hat   r egardl ess of  part ner 
1’s cont r act  t ype,   part ner  2 i s mo s t   l i kel y t o be a f i xed wa g e   em ployee gi ven t hat   t hi s i s 
t he  mo s t   com m on  cont r act  t ype.   Thi s suggest s t hat   coupl es ma y   be  pool i ng  t hei r   i ncom e 
r i sk. If  part ner 1 has a cont r act type characteri sed by i ncom e ri sk, i. e. a bonus pay 
cont r act  or  i s self -em ployed,   he/ she can off set  t hat   r i sk by havi ng a part ner  wi t h a f i xed 
wa g e   cont r act.
Thus,   t he patt erns i n t he r aw  dat a provi de som e preli mi nary evidence of  i nt r a-
househol d ri sk pool i ng.  Ho we v e r ,  closer exam inat i on al so reveals a high l evel of
cont r act type m at ching w i t hi n coupl es. Fi xed w age em pl oyees are m ore li kel y t o be 
pai r ed w it h anot her fi xed w age em pl oyee and t he i nci dence of bonus w orker coupl es 
and  self -em ployed  coupl es i s also r elati vel y  hi gh.  
III.II W orking  Ho u s e h o l d  M em bers
Tabl e Thr ee di f f ers f r om  Tabl e Two  i n as mu c h   as t he sam ple now  cont ains all   wo r ki ng 
me mb e r s of t he househol d,  t hus w e have i ncl uded m ari t al status vari ables and the 
vari ables for t he cont r act t ype of ot her househol d  me mb e r s are clearl y no l onger13
necessary.   We   sti l l ,   how ever,   consi der  t he econom i c status of  househol d me mb e r s w ho 
are out   of  t he  wo r kforce.
The  story  r em ains  vi r t ual l y  unchanged,   so we   wi l l   concentr ate on  t he  di f f erences 
onl y.   Wi t h r espect  t o ma r i t al  status,   we   f i nd t hat   f i xed wa g e   em ployees are mo s t   l i kel y 
t o be separated, wi dow ed,  di vorced or singl e as opposed t o bei ng m arr i ed. Bonus 
cont r act em ployees m ore li kel y t o be si ngl e and self -em ployed i ndi vi dual s are m ost 
l i kel y  t o  be  ma r r i ed.    The  pat t erns  i n  t he  status  of  ot her  househol d  me mb e r s now   change; 
wh i l st the unem pl oyed and t he si ck househol d  me mb e r s are sti l l  concentr ated am ong 
f i xed  wa g e   em ployees,  r eti r ed househol d  me mb e r s also j oi n  t hi s group.   The  i nci dence  of 
unoccupi ed peopl e i n  t he  househol d  becom es mo r e f r equent   f or  t he  self -em ployed.
The di scussion above i s based on relati onshi ps observed i n t he raw  data.
De t ail ed econom et r i c analysi s is necessary t o subst anti ate the robust ness of t hese
f i ndi ngs.  To  s u mma r i se, our preli mi nary review  of the raw  data suggest s that  som e of 
t he det ermi nant s of  em ploym ent   cont r act  t ype are l i kel y t o be observabl e i ndi vi dual   and 
househol d characteri sti cs such as those i l l ust r ated in Tabl es O ne, Tw o and Three. A 
det ail ed di scussion  of  our  stati sti cal  f r am ew ork  i s presented i n  t he  f ol l ow i ng  secti on.
IV Stati sti cal  Fram ew ork
Ou r   dependent   vari able i s categori cal  i n  nat ure,  i . e.  t aking  t he  val ue  of  1  i f   t he  i ndi vi dual  
i sa  f i xed w age w orker,  2 i f  she/he i s a bonus cont r act wo r ker and 3 i f  she/he i s self -
em ployed.  W e expect that  indi vi dual  att r i but es and househol d characteri sti cs w il l  be 
i m port ant  i n  expl aini ng  vari ati ons  i n  i ndi vi dual s’  probabi l i t i es of  hol di ng  a specif i c t ype 
of em ploym ent  cont r act.  Ou r  m odel l i ng st r ategy i s to present three dif f erent stati sti cal 
f r am ew orks;  mu l t i nom i al l ogi t  analysi s, ordered probi t  analysi s and random  eff ects 
ordered probi t   analysi s. 14
The  f i r st  approach i s t o specif y a mu l t i nom i al  l ogi t   m odel   i n order  analyse wh a t  
t ype of indi vi dual  is li kel y t o be em pl oyed under each contr act type w i t hout  imp o s i ng 
any orderi ng on t he t hree types of em ploym ent .  W e specif y t he m odel  as fol l ow s;  
j Yi j =   i f   t he  i
t h  i ndi vi dual   i s characteri sed by  em ploym ent   cont r act  t ype  j   wh e r e j=  1,   2 
or  3 and i   i s t he i ndi vi dual   subscri pt   such t hat   I i , . . , 1 = .   Let   ( ) j Y P i j i j = = p   denot e t he 
probabi l i t y t hat   i ndi vi dual  i  i s em ployed under  cont r act  t ype j  wh e r e 1 3 2 1 = + + i i i p p p .
H ence,  t he mu l t i nom i al  l ogi t   m odel   i s gi ven by:
i j
i
i j X b
p
p







l n ( 1)
wh e r e i X  i s a vector  of  i ndi vi dual   specif i c characteri sti cs t hought   t o be corr elated wi t h 
em ploym ent   cont r act  t ype.
Ou r  second approach is to reconsi der wh a t  type of indi vi dual  is li kel y t o be 
em ployed under each contr act t ype w hi l st i m posi ng an orderi ng t hat  r efl ects thei r
r elati ve  i ncom e  uncert aint y.   The  orderi ng  of  cont r act  t ypes  i n  t he  ordered probi t   analysi s 
i s based on t he i mp l i ed degree of ‘i ncom e ri sk’ associated w it h each contr act.  Bonus 
cont r acts,  com pri sing a com ponent   of  bot h f i xed and vari able pay,   off er  a mi ddl e r oad 
bet w een the t wo  e x t r em es of fi xed w age and sel f -em ploym ent .
11 In t he cont ext of thi s 
paper,   we   f ocus  pri ma r i l y  on  t he  r i sk of  i ncom e  and  so presum e t hat   self -em ploym ent   i s 
r elati vel y m ore ri sky t han bonus cont r act em ploym ent ,  wh i ch is it self  relati vel y m ore 
r i sky t han fi xed w age em pl oym ent .  R ees and Shah (1986) adopt  a simi l ar approach 
except  t hat   t hei r   analysi s onl y consi ders t he choi ce bet w een r i sky self -em ploym ent   and 
f i xed wa g e   em ploym ent .
12  He r e,  we   appl y an ordered probi t   m odel   assum ing t hat   f i xed 
11  The  hypot hesi s t hat   PRP  generates a r elati vel y  r i sky  str eam  of  i ncom e  accords  wi t h  t he  r esult s of  Sei l er 
( 1984) w ho fi nds t hat  ‘i ncenti ve’ wo r kers in t he U S m anufacturi ng sect or experi ence higher yet  mo r e 
di spersed earni ngs  t han  ‘ t i me   r ate’  wo r kers. 
12  R ees and  Shah  ( 1986)  f i nd  t hat   t he  vari ance of  earni ngs  f or  t he  self - em ployed  i s over  t hree t i me s   t hat   of 
pai d  em ployees.15
w age em pl oym ent  i s characteri sed by t he l east i ncom e ri sk and self -em ploym ent
characteri sed by t he m ost  i ncom e ri sk w it h bonus em pl oym ent  l yi ng som ew here
bet w een t hese  extr em es. 
The  ordered probi t   m odel   i s based  on  a l atent  r egression  f r am ew ork  wh e r e:





i Y   i s unobserved,   we   observe  i Y  such t hat :
1
* 1 m ≤ = i i Y i f Y ( 3)
2
*
1 2 m m ≤ < = i i Y i f Y ( 4)
*
2 3 i i Y i f Y ≤ = m ( 5)
wh e r e t he m ’ s and b   are t he  unknow n  param eters t o  be  esti ma t ed.  A ssum ing  t hat   i e   i s 
norm all y di str i but ed across observat i ons wi t h a m ean of  zero and a vari ance of  one,   we  
obt ain  t he  f ol l ow i ng  probabi l i t i es:
() ( ) i i X Y P b m ′ − Φ = = 1 1( 6)
() ( ) ( ) i i i X X Y P b m b m ′ − Φ − ′ − Φ = = 1 2 2( 7)
() () () 2 1 1 3 = − = − = = i i i Y P Y P Y P ( 8)
wh e r e () . Φ   denotes t he  cum ulati ve  standard  norma l   di str i but i on.
Fi nal l y,   we   wi sh t o expl ore t he i m port ance of  unobservabl e i nt r a coupl e preferences 
i n  det ermi ni ng  t he  choi ce of  em ploym ent   cont r act  across dual   earner  coupl es.  I n  order  t o 
do t hi s, w e adopt  the fol l ow i ng random  eff ects ordered probi t  m odel  wh e r e the panel  
di me n s i on of our m odel  ari ses fr om  t he fact that  w e observe bot h  me mb e r s of each 
wo r ki ng coupl e.  Gi ven t hat   t he sam pli ng f r am e of  t he FES i s at  t he househol d l evel,   we  
are able t o create a bal anced panel   of  dat a for wo r ki ng coupl es. The m odel  is specif i ed 
as f ol l ow s:16
*
i c i c i c X Y n b + ′ = ( 9)
i c c i c h a n + = ( 10)
wh e r e
*
i c Y   i s t he  unobservabl e propensi t y  f or  i ncom e  r i sk of  i ndi vi dual   i   i n  coupl e c; i c Y
i s the i ndi vi dual ’ s observed em pl oym ent  cont r act type;   i c X i s a vector of exogenous 
characteri sti cs w hich are expected to i nfl uence
*
i c Y ; b  i s the associated vector of 
coeff i cients; c a   i s t he ‘ coupl e’  specif i c unobservabl e eff ect  wh i ch captures di f f erences 
i n preferences tow ards i ncom e ri sk across w orki ng coupl es; and  i c h  is a random  err or 
t erm.   We   assum e a r andom  eff ects specif i cati on,   wh e r e  ) I N( 0, ~
2
c s hic ,   and i n order  t o 
ma r gi nal i se t he l i kel i hood i t   i s assum ed t hat ,   condi t i onal   on t he  i c X, c a   are  ( )
2 , 0 a s I N
and are i ndependent   of  t he  i c i c X   t he and h .   Thi s i mp l i es t hat   t he corr elati on bet w een t he 











n n r ( 11)
Thus, r  represents the proport i on of the t ot al vari ance contr i but ed by t he panel  level 
vari ance com ponent .  A f ul l er di scussion of the random  eff ects probi t  mo d e l  and t he 
associated li kel i hood funct i on can be found i n A rul am palam  (1999).  The l i kel i hood i s 
com put ed usi ng  20  poi nt   G auss-H ermi t e quadrature [ see But l er  and  Mo f f i t t   ( 1982)] .  
Fi nal l y,   we   expl or e t he possibi l i t y of  em ploym ent   cont r act  t ype corr elati on i n a 
wi der cont ext by expl ori ng t he i m port ance of int r a-househol d preferences across all  
wo r ki n g  me mb e r s of t he househol d.  The m odel  i s ident i cal t o t hat  descri bed by
Equat i ons (9) t o (11) above w i t h t he c subscri pt  replaced w it h a uni que househol d 
i dent i f i er,h  wh e r e h goes  f r om   1  t o H.   Thus,   f or  t he  analysi s of  all   wo r ki ng  me mb e r s of 
t he househol d,  we  c r eate an unbal anced panel of dat a w here the m i ni m um  num ber of 
wo r ki ng i ndi vi dual s i n t he househol d i s one and t he ma x i mu m  num ber  i s seven.17
Ou r  set of expl anatory vari ables (t he vect or  i X)  cont ains a host  of vari ables 
wh i ch represents indi vi dual  att r i but es and househol d characteri sti cs thought  t o be
i m port ant  i n  expl aini ng  vari ati ons  i n  i ndi vi dual s’  probabi l i t i es of  hol di ng  a specif i c t ype 
of em ploym ent  cont r act.  The i ndi vi dual  characteri sti cs w e invest i gat e are the person’s 
gender,  age, and l evel of educati on.
13 I n addi t i on,  w e cont r ol  f or j ob speci f i c
characteri sti cs such as occupati on and i ndust r y.  The househol d characteri sti cs w e
cont r ol  for are the househol d’s level of incom e,
14 the num ber of preschool  chil dren in 
t he househol d,   t he num ber  of  school   age chil dren,  housi ng t enure,  geographi cal  r egions,  
survey  year  and  t he  econom i c status  of  ot her  i ndi vi dual s aged 16  years and  above  l i vi ng 
i n t he househol d,  i. e. those w ho are unem pl oyed,  sick, reti r ed, in furt her educati on or 
unoccupi ed.  I n t he case of  t he analysi s of  dual   earner  coupl es,  we   also i ncl ude a set  of 
dum m y vari ables w hich represents the em pl oym ent  cont r act t ype of ot her wo r ki ng
me mb e r s of  t he househol d.   These are,  how ever,   om i t t ed f r om  t he r andom  eff ects m odel  
of  all   wo r ki ng househol d me mb e r s since t hese i ndi vi dual s becom e observat i ons wi t hi n 
our  wo r ki ng househol d me mb e r s sam ple. 
VR e s u l t s
Ou r  result s are presented in Tabl es Four,  Fi ve and Si x i n t he A ppendi x.  Tabl e Four 
presents t he r esult s f r om  t he mu l t i nom i al  analysi s,  Tabl e Fi ve presents r esult s f r om  t he 
ordered probi t   analysi s and,   f i nal l y,   Tabl e Si x presents r esult s f r om  t he r andom  eff ects 
ordered probi t   analysi s.
V. IM u l t i nom i al   Logi t   Ana l ysi s
13  I n  t he  case of  t he  r andom   eff ects specif i cati on  on  t he  sam ple of  all   wo r ki ng  me mb e r s of  t he  househol d,  
we   also i ncl ude  d u mmy   vari ables  t o  capture  ma r i t al  status.
14 W e use househol d i ncom e rather than i ndi vi dual  incom e gi ven t hat  indi vi dual  incom e m ay be hi ghl y 
correlated  wi t h  em ployment   cont ract  t ype.18
Tur ni ng i ni t i all y t o t he mu l t i nom i al  l ogi t   analysi s of  dual   earner  coupl es,  we   wi l l   begi n 
by di scussing t he personal  characteri sti cs and then m ove on t o consi der househol d 
specif i c characteri sti cs. It  is apparent that  age im pacts concavely on t he probabi l i t y of 
bei ng a bonus cont r act  em ployee and on t he probabi l i t y of  bei ng self -em ployed r elati ve 
t o bei ng i n fi xed w age em pl oym ent .  Ou r  result s pert aini ng t o t he relati onshi p bet w een
age and t he probabi l i t y of  self -em ploym ent   accord wi t h t hose of  R ees and Shah  ( 1986).  
The m agni t ude of the est i ma t ed coeff i cients on t he age vari able suggest  that  the sel f -
em ployed are, on average, ol der than bonus cont act em ployees w ho i n t urn are older
t han fi xed w age em pl oyees. Wo me n  a r e less li kel y t o be ei t her a bonus cont r act
em ployee or  self -em ployed relati ve t o fi xed w age em pl oym ent .  It  is int eresti ng t o not e 
t hat  the sel f -em ployed are m ore li kel y t o have hi gher educati on w hi l st bonus cont r act
em ployees are m ore li kel y t o have furt her educati on relati ve t o t hei r  f i xed w age
count erpart s.
I t   i s apparent  t hat   bonus cont r act  em ployees are l ess concentr ated i n t he skil l ed, 
part l y ski l l ed and unski l l ed occupati onal  categori es relati ve t o fi xed w age emp l oyees
wh i l st the sel f -em ployed are less com m only found i n t he m anageri al and t echni cal,  
skil l ed and  part l y  skil l ed occupat i onal   classes r elati ve  t o  f i xed  wa g e   em ployees.
Ou r  key vari ables of int erest relate to t he em pl oym ent  cont r act type of one’s 
part ner.   I t   can been seen t hat   bonus cont r act  em ployees are mo r e l i kel y t han f i xed wa g e  
em ployees t o be part nered wi t h anot her  bonus cont r act  em ployee.  Si mi l arl y,   our  r esult s 
suggest   t hat   self -em ployed  i ndi vi dual s are mo r e l i kel y  t o  be  part nered wi t h  anot her  self -
em ployee. The posi t i ve associati on bet w een the probabi l i t y of self -em ploym ent  and 
havi ng a sel f -em ployed part ner appears to cont r adict t he i dea of i nt r a-coupl e ri sk 19
pool i ng l endi ng m ore support  to t he argum ent  based on t he i m port ance of tr ansfers of 
hum an  capit al  bet w een part ners and/ or  t he  phenom enon  of  assort ati ve  ma t i ng.
15
Tur ni ng  t o  househol d  characteri sti cs,  t he  f i ndi ngs  presented i n  Tabl e Four   accord 
wi t h our observat i ons fr om  t he raw  data discussed in Secti on II I .  Bonus cont r act
em ployees appear  t o l i ve i n t he r i chest  househol ds wh i l st  f i xed wa g e   em ployees,  on t he 
ot her  hand,   appear  t o r eside i n t he poorest  househol ds.   Ou r   f i ndi ngs r elated t o housi ng 
t enure suggest  that  bonus cont r act em ployees are m ore li kel y t o ow n t hei r  hom e vi a a 
mo r t gage relati ve t o fi xed w age em pl oyees w hereas the l arge and hi ghl y si gni f i cant 
esti ma t ed coeff i cient for the vari able ‘ow ned out r i ght ’  suggest s that  the sel f -em ployed
have greater  w ealt h i n t he f orm  of  assets r elati ve t o f i xed wa g e   em ployees.  I n a simi l ar 
vei n,   Ki dd ( 1993)  and Be r nhardt   ( 1994)  f i nd t hat   t he avail abil i t y of  capit al  pl ays a key 
r ol e in m odel s of self -em ploym ent .  To be specif i c, Be r nhardt  (1994) fi nds w orki ng 
wi ves,  hom e ow nership and t he avail abil i t y of invest me n t  incom e t o be posi t i ve and 
signi f i cant  i ndi cators of  t he  probabi l i t y  of  self -em ploym ent .
Tur ni ng t o t he vari ables representi ng t he com posi t i on of the househol d,  bonus 
cont r act em ployees (self -em ployees) are less (mo r e) li kel y t o have chi l dren (bot h pre-
school  and school  age) relati ve t o fi xed w age em pl oyees. Re ga r di ng t he em pl oym ent  
status of  adul t   househol d me mb e r s ot her  t han one’s part ner,   we   f i nd t hat   bonus cont r act 
em ployees are l ess l i kel y  t o  r eside  wi t h  a f i xed  wa g e   em ployee and  mo r e l i kel y  t o  r eside 
wi t h ot her bonus cont r act em ployees, rel ati ve t o fi xed w age w orkers. Sel f -em ployed
i ndi vi dual s are l ess l i kel y t o have an unem pl oyed i ndi vi dual   i n t he househol d – i t   ma y  
t he case t hat   a self -em ployed i ndi vi dual   i s able t o absorb ot her  househol d me mb e r s i nt o 
15  I t   i s apparent  f r om  Tabl e Four  t hat   havi ng a self - em ployed  part ner  exert s a l arge  and  posi t i ve  i nfl uence 
on  t he  probabi l i t y  of  bei ng  self - em ployed.   I t   ma y   be  t he  case t hat   t hi s captures t he  eff ect  of  coupl es w ho 
j oi nt l y  run  fam il y  busi nesses.  On e   proxy  t hat   has  been used  i n  t he  l i t erature t o  i dent i f y  such coupl es i s t o 
i dent i f y t hose coupl es w ho m at ch ident i call y on bot h sel f - em ploym ent   t ype and t he t hree di gi t   i ndust r y 
classif i cati on  [ see,  f or  exam ple Br uce ( 1999)  and  Lombar d  ( 2001)] .  Fol l ow i ng  t hi s me t hodol ogy,   we   f i nd 20
hi s/her busi ness. Mo r eover,  Bor j as (1986) argues t hat  such an arr angem ent  ma y
mi ni mi se t he  r i sk of  em ployees shir ki ng  gi ven  t hat   f am il y  me mb e r s em ployed  wi t hi n  t he 
f am il y  busi ness ma y   have  t he  sam e i ncenti ve,   i . e.  t o  ma x i mi se f am il y  profi t .  
The  self -em ployed are also l ess l i kel y t o r eside wi t h i ndi vi dual s em ployed under 
bonus cont r acts and mo r e l i kel y t o r eside wi t h ot her  self -em ployed i ndi vi dual s r elati ve 
t o  f i xed  wa g e   wo r kers.  I n  general,   our  f i ndi ngs  r elated t o  t he  em ploym ent   cont r act  t ypes 
of ot her wo r ki ng househol d  me mb e r s suggest  t hat  t he phenom enon of em ploym ent  
cont r act type m at ching m ay al so be tr ue i n t he w i der cont ext of wo r ki ng househol d 
me mb e r s as we l l   as wi t hi n  dual   earner  coupl es.
V. II O rdered Probi t   Ana l ysi s
Tabl e Five presents the result s fr om  t he ordered probi t  analysi s of dual  earner coupl es 
wh e r e our dependant  vari able represents an orderi ng of t he degree of i ncom e ri sk 
associated wi t h each em ploym ent   cont r act  t ype.   I n general,   t he r esult s f r om  t he ordered 
probi t  analysi s accord w i t h t he result s fr om  t he m ul t i nom i al analysi s presented above.  
For   r easons of  brevit y,   we   wi l l   onl y  c o mme n t   on  selected r esult s. 
The var i ables pert aini ng t o t he nat ure of t he em pl oym ent  cont r act of t he
r espondent ’ s part ner i ndi cate that  t he degree of i ncom e ri sk associated w it h an
i ndi vi dual ’ s em ployment  cont r act i s posi t i vel y corr elated w it h t he degree of r i sk
associated w it h hi s/her part ner’ s em ploym ent  cont r act suggest i ng t hat  em ploym ent
cont r act ma t ching i s observed i n dual  earner coupl es rather t han t he hol di ng of a 
di versif i ed port f ol i o of em pl oym ent  cont r acts. Thus,  our result s m ay be regarded as 
support  f or posi t i ve assort ati ve m at i ng w hereby i ndi vi dual s simi l arl y i ncl i ned t o a
part i cular  degree of  i ncom e r i sk are l i kel y t o ma r r y/ cohabi t .
t hat  173 out  of 523 coupl es w ho are bot h sel f - em ployed m ay be regarded as runni ng a fam il y busi ness 
t oget her.21
I n addi t i on,   our  r esult s suggest   t hat   hi gher  l evels of hum an capit al  as proxi ed by 
educati on are associated wi t h wi l l i ngness t o accept  i ncom e r i sk.  Si mi l arl y,   evidence by 
R ees and Shah (1986),  Bor j as (1986),  Bor j as and B ronars (1989) and Evans and
Lei ght on (1989) suggest s that  educati onal  att ainm ent  is posi t i vely corr elated w it h t he 
probabi l i t y  of  self -em ploym ent .
Fi nal l y,   our  f i ndi ngs r elated t o t he em ploym ent   cont r act  t ypes of  ot her  wo r ki ng 
househol d me mb e r s suggest   t hat   t he phenom enon of  em ploym ent   cont r act  ma t ching i n 
t he w i der cont ext of wo r ki ng househol d m em bers is dom inat ed by t he case of self -
em ploym ent .
V. II Random   Ef f ects Ana l ysi s
Ou r  r esult s so far support  em ploym ent  cont r act t ype m at ching w i t hi n dual  earner
coupl es rather t han i ncom e ri sk pool i ng vi a a diversif i ed port f ol i o of em ploym ent  
cont r act types betw een part ners. For  thi s reason, w e conduct  random  eff ects ordered 
probi t   analysi s i n  order  t o  capture t he  degree and  signi f i cance of  i nt r a coupl e preferences 
i n det ermi ni ng observed em pl oym ent  cont r act types.  He r e w e are exploi t i ng t he panel  
elem ent  of  our  dat a,  i . e.  our  observat i ons can be grouped by coupl es i n order  t o capture 
t he presence of a coupl e specif i c unobservabl e eff ect pert aini ng t o di f f erences in
preferences tow ards i ncom e ri sk across dual  earner coupl es. The r andom  eff ects
f r am ew ork al l ow s  us  t o  establi sh how   mu c h   of  t he  vari ati on  i n  t he  dat a can be  expl ained 
by unobservabl e i nt r a-coupl e corr elati ons.  
The esti ma t ed coeff i cients presented in Tabl e Six relate to t he sam pl e of dual  
earner coupl es and accord w i t h our previous fi ndi ngs and, therefore, w e centr e our 
di scussion on t he val ue of r   wh e r e r   r epresents t he proport i on of  t he t ot al  vari ance i n 
t he dependant   vari able cont r i but ed by t he panel   l evel  vari ance com ponent .   We   f i nd t hat  
r   i s hi ghl y signi f i cant  and i t s m agni t ude suggest s t hat   11%  of  t he t ot al  vari ance i n t he 22
dependant  vari able is expl ained by an unobservabl e coupl e specif i c eff ect wh i l st the 
r em aini ng vari ance is expl ained by unobservabl e indi vi dual  specif i c eff ects.
16  Thus,  
gi ven t hat   t he coupl e specif i c eff ect  expl ains 11%  of  t he unobserved vari ance and t hat  
t he coupl e specif i c eff ect  i s based on corr elati ons across t he dependant   vari able wi t hi n 
coupl es,  our  f i ndi ngs provi de evidence of  i nt r a-coupl e corr elati on wi t hi n t he dependant  
vari able l endi ng  f urt her  support   f or  em ploym ent   cont r act  t ype  ma t ching.
Wh i l st our pri ma r y focus i s on dual  earner coupl es, for com pleteness given t he 
evidence presented in Tabl es Four and Fi ve pert aini ng t o ot her wo r ki ng househol d 
me mb e r s,  we   extend our  panel   analysi s t o all   wo r ki ng househol d me mb e r s.  Thi s all ow s 
us t o consi der t he hypot hesi s that  t he phenom enon of em ploym ent  cont r act t ype
ma t ching  i s prevalent  i n  t he  broader  cont ext  of  t he  househol d  r ather  t han  bei ng  confi ned 
t o dual   earner  coupl es.  He r e,  we   f i nd t hat   t he size of r  is sm all er (at 8% ) than i n t he 
case of dual  earner coupl es but  i s of simi l ar signi f i cance. H ence, even w it hi n t hi s 
broader groupi ng of i ndi vi dual s, t he vari ance com ponent  specif i cati on i s sti l l
appropri ate, i. e. a signi f i cant househol d specif i c eff ect rem ains.  These fi ndi ngs,  thus,  
provi de furt her evidence hi ghl i ght i ng t he i m port ance of em ploym ent  cont r act t ype
ma t ching.
The hi gh degree of consi stency across the result s deri ved fr om  t he t hree
stati sti cal fr am ew orks hi ghl i ght s the robust ness of our fi ndi ngs.  To  s u mma r i se, our 
analysi s provi des evi dence of em ploym ent  cont r act t ype m at ching bot h w i t hi n dual
earner coupl es and, t o a l esser degree, i n t he w i der cont ext of wo r ki ng househol d 
me mb e r s.
16  In t he  case w here r   equal s zero,   t he  panel   l evel  vari ance com ponent   i s uni m port ant.   I n  t hi s case,  t he 
panel   esti ma t or  i s no  di f f erent  f r om   t he  pool ed  esti ma t or.  23
VI Conc l usi on
The  aim  of  our  paper  wa s   t o  expl ore t he  signi f i cance of  i nt r a-coupl e and  i nt r a-househol d
i nfl uences for observed em pl oym ent  cont r act type by anal ysi ng a sam pl e of wo r ki ng 
coupl es and an extended sam pl e of wo r ki ng househol d  me mb e r s. To be specif i c, we  
have focused on t he si gni f i cance of em ploym ent  cont r act t ype m at ching w hereby
i ndi vi dual s wi t hi n  a coupl e or  househol d  are em ployed  under  simi l ar  cont r acts. 
Fr om  our  analysi s of  t he Fam i l y Expendi t ure Surveys 1996 t o 2000,   we   present 
evidence suggest i ng  t hat   i ndi vi dual s are mo r e l i kel y  t o  group  wi t h  ot her  i ndi vi dual s wi t h 
simi l ar (as opposed t o di versif i ed) em ploym ent  cont r acts provi di ng support  for t he 
phenom enon of em ploym ent  cont r act type m at ching w i t hi n coupl es and househol ds.  
Tw o possi bl e explanati ons for thi s phenom enon are as fol l ow s.  Fi r stl y,  the benefi t s of 
ma t ching wi t h ‘ l i ke-m i nded’  peopl e ( t hose wi t h simi l ar  t astes,  preferences or  degrees of 
r i sk aversion) ma y  s i mp l y out we i gh t he benefi t s of incom e ri sk pool i ng.  Indeed, the 
assort ati ve ma t i ng l i t erature suggest s t hat   peopl e ma y   f i nd such ‘ l i ke-m i nded’  peopl e i n 
t he w orkpl ace.
17 Secondl y,  tr ansfers of speciali sed hum an capi t al wi t hi n dual  earner 
coupl es and wi t hi n househol ds ma y   i ncrease t he associated benefi t s of  hol di ng ma t ched 
cont r act t ypes.  Such t r ansfers of hum an capit al m ay enhance t he earni ngs pot enti al
wi t hi n coupl es and househol ds.  Fur t hermo r e, the benefi t s fr om  enhanced earni ngs for 
coupl es and househol ds m at ched on self -em ploym ent  and bonus cont r acts m ay be of 
suff i cient  m agni t ude  t o  off set  t he  i ncom e  r i sk associated wi t h  such cont r acts. 
Un f ort unat ely,  wh i l st our dat a all ow s us t o quant i f y t he degree to w hi ch
ma t ching occurs wi t hi n dual   earner  coupl es and wi t hi n wo r ki ng househol d me mb e r s,  i t  
does not   all ow  us t o di f f erenti ate bet w een t hese t wo   com peti ng expl anati ons.   Mo r eover,  
17 Un f ort unat ely,  gi ven t hat  our dat a is a cross- secti on w e are unabl e to i nvest i gat e the em pl oym ent  
cont r acts of  our  coupl es  at  t he  t i me   wh e n   t hey  me t .  24
i t  i s li kel y t hat  bot h have a si gni f i cant rol e to pl ay in det ermi ni ng t he degree of
em ploym ent   cont r act  ma t ching  i dent i f i ed by  our  analysi s.
H ence, one i m port ant area for fut ure research concerns det ail ed analysi s of the 
r easons w hy em pl oym ent  cont r act type m at ching occurs. It  is apparent that  if  the t wo  
expl anati ons  put   f orwa r d  above  are corr ect,   t hen  em ploym ent   cont r act  t ype  ma t ching  has 
i m port ant i mp l i cati ons.  Tr ansfers of hum an capit al wi t hi n coupl es and w it hi n
househol ds enhance earni ngs pot enti al vi a enhanced product i vi t y.  I n addi t i on,  i f
em ploym ent  cont r act type m at ching w i t h ‘l i ke-m i nded’ indi vi dual s enhances ut i l i t y or 
happi ness w it hi n coupl es or wi t hi n househol ds,  t hen t hi s m ay have i m port ant
i mp l i cati ons for labour ma r ket  behavi our such as reduced turnover and l ow er rates of 
absenteeism  servi ng t o furt her enhance product i vi t y.
18 Thus,  i t  i s apparent t hat
em ploym ent  cont r act t ype m at ching m ay have si gni f i cant i mp l i cati ons for t he
product i vi t yo f   ma t ched i ndi vi dual s and,   hence,   f or  t he  econom y  as a w hol e.
18  See  Os wa l d  ( 1997)  f or  a  det ail ed  r eview   of  t he  r ol e  of  happi ness i n  econom i cs.25
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Appendi x
Tabl e  One :   S u mma r y   St at i sti cs
Sam pl e:  M em bers of  Dua l   Ear ne r   Coupl es 
a
Fi xed  wage Bonus Sel f - em ployed
Ge nd e r
Ma l es 58. 78 25. 05 16. 17
Femal es 75. 41 17. 75 6. 84
Age
16  <  Age  <  19 92. 68 4. 88 2. 44
20  <  Age  <  29 66. 48 27. 59 5. 93
30  <  Age  <  39 66. 81 22. 52 10. 66
40  <  Age  <  49 68. 24 19. 46 12. 30
Age  >  50 66. 05 17. 97 15. 98
Educ at i on  l evel
Less t han  G CSE 67. 47 18. 42 14. 12
G CSE 66. 77 21. 99 11. 25
Fur t her  Educat i on 66. 71 23. 73 9. 56
Hi gher  Educat i on 67. 63 21. 08 11. 29
O ccupati on
Pr of essional 54. 42 25. 72 19. 86
M anageri al   &  t echni cal 67. 91 22. 79 9. 29
Ski l l ed 65. 83 22. 35 11. 83
Par t l y  skil l ed 70. 79 17. 35 11. 87
Un s k i l l ed 76. 24 11. 74 12. 02
Ho u s i ng  Tenure
Rent ed  l ocal   aut hori t y 73. 05 17. 76 9. 19
Rent ed  pri vate 70. 65 17. 61 11. 74
Own e r   occupi er 66. 73 22. 56 10. 72
        O wned  out right 63. 62 17. 00 19. 38
  A verage  Ho u s e h o l d  i ncom e  ( £) 686. 79 775. 56 717. 35
Chi l dren  ( A verage  Numb e r )
    Pr e  school   Chi l dren 0. 25 0. 26 0. 22
      Chi l dren  aged  bet w een
    5  and  16  years 0. 59 0. 50 0. 64
Ho u s e h o l d  com posi t i on
b
      Un e mp l oyed  person 0.020 0. 014 0. 014
Si ck  person 0.004 0. 002 0. 003
Ret i red person      0. 006 0. 005 0. 009
U noccupi ed  person 0.007 0. 004 0. 008
Ful l - t i me   educat i on 0. 054 0. 038 0. 060
Fi xed  wage  person 0.148 0. 125 0. 158
Bonus  cont ract  person 0.033 0. 039 0. 030
Sel f - em ployed  person 0.006 0. 006 0. 015
a  Nu mb e r s are expressed as a percentage of  t he t ot al  num ber  of  i ndi vi dual s across t he t hree cont r act 
t ypes  f or  each i ndi vi dual   characteri sti c.
b  The  f ol l ow i ng  set  of  d u mmy   vari ables r efers t o  t he  presence or  ot herwi se of  at  l east  one  i ndi vi dual   i n 
t he househol d 16 years of  age and above ( ot her  t han t he r espondent   and hi s/her  part ner)   exhi bi t i ng t he 
stated characteri sti c e.g.   bei ng unem pl oyed or  i n f ul l   t i me   educati on.   The  f i gure r epresents t he m ean 
val ue  of  t he  d u mmy   vari able.28
Tabl e  Two:   Di stribut i on  of  Cont ract  Type  wi t hi n  Dua l   Ear ne r   Coupl es
Par t ner  1
Fi xed  wage Bonus Sel f - Empl oyed
Numbe r Pe r   Ce nt Numbe r Pe r   Ce nt Numbe r Pe r   Ce nt
Fi xed  wage 8862 71. 20 2338 58. 88 1246 58. 36
Par t ner  2 Bonus 2338 18. 79 1276 32. 13 357 16. 72
Sel f - em ployed 1246 10. 01 357 8. 99 532 24. 9229
Tabl e  Three:  S u mma r y   St at i sti cs
Sam pl e:  Al l   Wo r k i ng  M em bers of  t he  Ho u s e h o l d 
a
Fi xed  wage Bonus Sel f - em ployed
Ge nd e r
Ma l es 60. 19 24. 79 15. 02
Femal es 76. 55 17. 32 6. 13
Ma r i t al   stat us
  M arried 66. 48 21. 40 12. 12
  Separat ed/wi dowed/ di vorced 71.67 18. 10 10. 23
  Si ngl e 72. 48 22. 06 5. 46
Age
16  <  Age  <  19 84. 47 13. 79 1. 74
20  <  Age  <  29 69. 54 24. 96 5. 50
30  <  Age  <  39 66. 56 23. 05 10. 39
40  <  Age  <  49 67. 51 19. 19 12. 56
Age  >  50
66. 83 17. 70 15. 47
Educ at i on  l evel
Less t han  G CSE 68. 35 18. 24 13. 41
G CSE 68. 07 21. 50 10. 43
Fur t her  Educat i on 67. 69 23. 50 8. 81
Hi gher  Educat i on 67. 65 21. 44 10. 90
O ccupati on
Pr of essional 56. 81 25. 34 17. 85
M anageri al   &  t echni cal 67. 23 23. 29 9. 47
Ski l l ed 66. 94 22. 14 10. 92
Par t l y  skil l ed 72. 41 17. 01 10. 58
Un s k i l l ed 78. 27 11. 70 10. 03
Ho u s i ng  Tenure
Rent ed  l ocal   aut hori t y 76. 01 16. 77 7. 22
Rent ed  pri vate 70. 80 17. 77 11. 44
Own e r   occupi er 66. 43 23. 15 10. 42
        O wned  out right 77. 23 17. 44 15. 32
A verage  Ho u s e h o l d  i ncom e  ( £) 613. 92 714. 53 652. 70
Chi l dren  ( A verage  Numb e r )
      Pr e  school   Chi l dren 0. 21 0. 24 0. 23
      Chi l dren  aged  bet w een  5  &  16
      years 0. 48 0. 40 0. 58
Ho u s e h o l d  com posi t i on
b
      Un e mp l oyed  person 0.043 0. 038 0. 031
Si ck  person 0.039 0. 030 0. 020
Ret i red person 0.046 0. 036 0. 039
U noccupi ed  person 0.080 0. 100 0. 138
Ful l - t i me   educat i on 0. 054 0. 039 0. 059
a  Nu mb e r s are expressed as a percentage of  t he t ot al  num ber  of  i ndi vi dual s across t he t hree cont r act 
t ypes  f or  each i ndi vi dual   characteri sti c.
b  The  f ol l ow i ng  set  of  d u mmy   vari ables  r efers t o  t he presence or  ot herwi se of  at  l east  one  i ndi vi dual   i n 
t he househol d 16 years of  age and above ( ot her  t han t he r espondent   and hi s/her  part ner)   exhi bi t i ng t he 
stated characteri sti c e.g.   bei ng unem pl oyed or  i n f ul l   t i me   educati on.   The  f i gure r epresents t he me a n
val ue  of  t he  d u mmy   vari able.30
Tabl e  Four :   Mu l t i nom i al   Logi t   Anal ysis:
Sam pl e:  M em bers of  Dua l   Ear ne r   Coupl es
Bonus  Cont ract Sel f-em ployed Ma r gi nal   Ef f ects







Femal e- 0. 3957 - 8. 66 - 1. 1658 - 18. 08 0. 1131 - 0. 0416 - 0. 0715
Age 0. 0480 2. 73 0. 0849 3. 62 - 0. 0107 0. 0057 0. 0050
Age  squared - 0. 0007 - 3. 38 - 0. 0007 - 2. 50 0. 0001 - 0. 0001 0. 0000
Cohabi t / m arried  t o  bonus 0. 6678 14. 07 0. 2742 3. 87 - 0. 1003 0. 0903 0. 0100
Cohabi t / m arried  t o  self - em p 0.1877 2. 61 1. 4316 20. 08 - 0. 1007 0. 0093 0. 0913
GCS E 0 . 0554 0. 92 0. 1176 1. 60 - 0. 0134 0. 0064 0. 0070
Fur t her  Educat i on 0. 1438 2. 10 0. 0943 1. 08 - 0. 0235 0. 0190 0. 0045
Hi gher  Educat i on 0. 1162 1. 51 0. 2196 2. 31 - 0. 0266 0. 0137 0. 0130
M anageri al   &  t echni cal -0. 0877 - 1. 02 - 0. 5933 - 5. 86 0. 0430 - 0. 0053 - 0. 0377
Ski l l ed -0. 3324 - 3. 66 - 0. 3460 - 3. 18 0. 0611 - 0. 0425 - 0. 0187
Par t l y  skil l ed -0. 3430 - 3. 32 - 0. 2782 - 2. 27 0. 0589 - 0. 0447 - 0. 0141
Un s k i l l ed -0. 6401 - 4. 75 - 0. 2560 - 1. 73 0. 0958 - 0.0866 - 0. 0092
H ousehol d  i ncom e 0. 0003 4. 95 0. 0002 2. 51 0. 0000 0. 0000 0. 0000
Preschool   Chi l dren - 0. 0882 - 2. 15 0. 0996 1. 79 0. 0060 - 0. 0135 0. 0075
Chi l dren  aged  5- 15  years -0. 0819 - 3. 26 0. 1197 3. 94 0. 0041 - 0. 0129 0. 0088
Rent ed  pri vate- 0. 2414 - 1. 97 0. 4612 2. 98 0. 0063 - 0. 0393 0. 0330
Own e r   occupi er 0.1472 1. 77 0. 3532 3. 15 - 0. 0378 0. 0164 0. 0213
O wned  out right 0. 1618 1. 47 0. 7459 5. 63 - 0. 0607 0. 0138 0. 0468
Un e mp l oyed  person -0. 1779 - 1. 10 - 0. 5003 - 2. 34 0. 0496 - 0. 0190 - 0. 0306
Si ck  person -0. 7319 - 1. 71 - 0. 4831 - 1. 05 0. 1197 - 0. 0968 - 0. 0229
Ret i red person -0. 0668 - 0. 24 0. 1580 0. 55 0. 0001 - 0. 0112 0. 0111
U noccupi ed  person -0. 3343 - 1. 14 - 0. 2044 - 0. 68 0. 0538 - 0. 0444 - 0. 0094
Ful l - t i me   educat i on - 0. 1868 - 1. 80 0. 0979 0. 86 0. 0187 - 0. 0273 0. 0086
Fi xed  wage  person -0. 1473 -2. 30 0. 0013 0. 02 0. 0188 - 0. 0206 0. 0018
Bonus  cont ract  person 0.2299 2. 13 -0. 3624 - 2. 40 - 0. 0101 0. 0365 - 0. 0264
Sel f - em ployed  person 0.0740 0. 28 0. 6169 2. 52 - 0. 0425 0. 0031 0. 0394
Const ant - 1. 4477 - 3. 59 - 5. 6530 - 8. 94
I ndust ry Y es Y es
Regi on Yes Yes
Sam pl e  Year Yes Yes
Numbe r   of   O bservati ons 18552
Log  l i keli hood - 12771. 02
Pseudo  R  squared 0. 1869
Chi - Squared  St at i sti c 5869. 59  ( 106  d.   f . )31
Tabl e  Fi ve:  O rdered  Probi t   Anal ysis
Sam pl e:  M em bers of  Dua l   Ear ne r   Coupl es
b t - stat Ma r gi nal   Ef f ects
a
Femal e- 0. 4000 - 18. 05 - 0. 3994
Age 0. 0197 2. 37 0. 0175
Age  squared - 0. 0002 - 1. 81 - 0. 0002
Cohabi t / m arried  t o  bonus  em ployee 0.2521 10. 67 0. 2527
Cohabi t / m arried  t o  self - em ployee 0.5415 17. 86 0. 5408
GCS E 0 . 0513 1. 80 0. 0491
Fur t her  Educat i on 0. 0742 2. 28 0. 0722
Hi gher  Educat i on 0. 1047 2. 90 0. 1030
M anageri al   &  t echni cal -0. 2243 - 5. 62 - 0. 2242
Ski l l ed -0. 2065 - 4. 86 - 0. 2066
Par t l y  skil l ed -0. 1926 - 4. 01 - 0. 1931
Un s k i l l ed -0. 2707 - 4. 55 - 0. 2716
H ousehol d  i ncom e 0. 0001 3. 40 0. 0001
Pr e  school   Chi l dren 0. 0035 0. 18 0. 0054
Chi l dren  aged  5- 15  years 0.0154 1. 31 0. 0224
Rent ed  pri vate0 . 0722 1. 26 0. 0749
Own e r   occupi er 0.1412 3. 52 0. 1433
O wned  out right 0. 2929 5. 78 0. 2958
Un e mp l oyed  person -0. 1912 - 2. 49 - 0. 2004
Si ck  person -0. 3386 - 1. 86 - 0. 3375
Ret i red person 0.0224 0. 18 0. 0216
U noccupi ed  person -0. 1184 - 0. 94 - 0. 1202
Ful l - t i me   educat i on - 0. 0017 - 0. 04 - 0. 0188
Fi xed  wage  person -0. 0296 - 1. 00 - 0. 0376
Bonus  cont ract  person -0. 0409 - 0. 77 - 0. 0429
Sel f - em ployed  person 0.2738 2. 47 0. 2726
    Cut   poi nt   11 . 0951
    Cut   poi nt 21 . 9663
I ndust ry Y es
Regi on Yes
Sam pl e  Year Yes
Numbe r   of   O bservati ons 18552
  l og  l i keli hood - 13944. 957
Pseudo  R  squared 0. 1121
Chi - Squared  St at i sti c 3521. 71  ( 53  d. f . )
aThe  ma r gi nal   eff ects are based on t he l i near  predicti on f r om  t he esti ma t ed coeff i cients and
are calculated at  t he  m ean val ues  of  t he  expl anatory  vari ables.32
Tabl e  Si x:  Random   Ef f ects O rdered  Probi t   M odel s
Sam pl e
D ual   Ear ner   Coupl es W orking  H ousehol d  Me mb e r s
b t - stat
Ma r gi nal
Ef f ects
a b t - stat
Ma r gi nal
Ef f ects
a
Femal e- 0. 3365 - 15. 03 -0. 3365 - 0. 3009 - 17. 46 -0. 3011
Age 0. 0216 2. 42 0. 0216 0. 0472 9. 04 0. 0477
Age  squared - 0. 0002 - 1. 83 - 0. 0002 - 0. 0005 - 7. 05 - 0. 0005
Separat ed/wi dowed/ divorced --- - 0. 0320 - 1. 08 - 0. 0327
Si ngl e --- - 0. 0976 - 3. 80 - 0. 0992
GCS E 0 . 0576 1. 91 0. 0576 0. 0660 2. 87 0. 0667
Fur t her  Educat i on 0. 0818 2. 37 0. 0818 0. 0947 3. 62 0. 0953
Hi gher  Educat i on 0. 1123 2. 93 0. 1123 0. 1439 5. 01 0. 1448
M anageri al   &  t echni cal -0.2343 - 5. 55 - 0. 2343 - 0. 1463 - 4. 57 - 0. 1465
Ski l l ed -0. 2146 - 4. 78 - 0. 2146 - 0. 1683 - 4. 99 - 0. 1685
Par t l y  skil l ed -0. 2107 - 4. 16 - 0. 2107 - 0. 1953 - 5. 18 - 0. 1952
Un s k i l l ed -0. 3047 - 4. 85 - 0. 3047 - 0. 3186 - 6. 89 - 0. 3185
H ousehol d  i ncom e 0. 0001 3. 83 0. 0001 0. 0000 2. 68 0.0000
Pr e  school   Chi l dren 0. 0062 0. 29 0. 0062 0. 0371 2. 21 0. 0372
Chi l dren  aged  5- 15  years 0.0186 1. 47 0. 0186 0. 0121 1. 26 0. 0087
Rent ed  pri vate0 . 0834 1. 34 0. 0834 0. 1629 4. 30 0. 1620
Own e r   occupi er 0.1625 3. 73 0. 1625 0. 1739 6. 27 0. 1731
O wned  out right 0. 3554 6. 44 0. 3554 0. 2708 7. 88 0. 2700
Un e mp l oyed  person -0. 2447 - 2. 93 - 0. 2447 - 0. 1072 - 2. 68 - 0. 1099
Si ck  person -0. 4071 - 2. 06 - 0. 4071 - 0. 1696 - 3. 79 - 0. 1702
Ret i red person 0.0488 0. 36 0. 0488 - 0. 1102 - 2. 72 - 0. 1101
U noccupi ed  person -0. 1478 - 1. 09 - 0. 1478 0. 0403 1. 50 0. 0407
Ful l - t i me   educat i on - 0. 0127 - 0. 26 - 0. 0127 - 0. 0403 - 1. 10 - 0. 0477
Fi xed  wage  person -0. 0397 - 1. 23 - 0. 0397 - -
Bonus  cont ract  person -0. 0488 - 0. 84 - 0. 0488 - -
Sel f - em ployed  person 0.3466 2. 87 0. 3466 - -
Cut   poi nt 11 . 1278 5. 28 1. 6531 11. 85
Cut   poi nt   22 . 0374 9. 51 2. 5589 18. 26
r 0. 1147 8. 16 0. 0768 8. 11
I ndust ry Y es Y es
Regi on Yes Yes
Sam pl e  Year Yes Yes
Numbe r   of   O bservati ons 18552 31862
Log  l i keli hood - 14089. 011 - 23844. 285
Chi - Squared  St at i sti c 3158. 97  ( 51  d. f . ) 5242. 03  ( 50  d. f . )
aThe  ma r gi nal   eff ects are based  on  t he  l i near  predicti on  f r om   t he  esti ma t ed coeff i cients and  are calculated at  t he
m ean val ues  of  t he  expl anatory  vari ables.